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The Shared Political Production of
‘the East’ as a ‘Resistant’ Territory
and Cultural Sphere in the Kemalist
Era, 1923-1938
Jordi Tejel Gorgas
1 Scholars have traditionally underlined the power of symbolic imposition by states on
their citizens and dissident groups. Analyzing ‘the Vendée’1 (1793) as a symbol of the
counter-revolution in France, Charles Suaud, for instance, argues that popular cultures,
even the most ‘rebellious,’ possess a low degree of autonomy relative to the work of
symbolic imposition by the state (Suaud 1997: 3-23). Though Suaud admits a degree of
interaction between the symbolic production of the dissident groups and that of the
state, he gives primacy to the latter. For this author, along the same line of thought as
Pierre Bourdieu (1993: 571-625),  the state uses various means to organize visions of
society and forms of conduct that ‘individuals internalize imperceptibly as a political “
unthought” (impensée) which applies to everyone, even those who had thought they
could escape it’ (Suaud 1997: 4).
2 Without neglecting the state’s symbolic strength, this paper suggests that in particular
historical  circumstances,  the  interaction  between  the  state  and  anti-establishment
actors in the symbolic field can be much more balanced than typically represented. I
suggest that, following Bernard Lahire’s invitation, we must historicize the validity of
sociological concepts and not ‘generalize the theoretical approaches interpreted in a
relatively  restricted  context’  (Lahire  1998:  249).  In  this  sense,  the  Kemalist  period
(1923-1938),  which  was  marked  by  high  levels  of  international  pressure  (peace
negotiations) and several internal rebellions (Kurdish revolts, the Menemen incident),
is a useful case study due to the great fluidity of parallel ideological productions and
the  mutual  interaction  between  the  Turkish  state  and  Kurdish  nationalists  in  the
creation of collective social representations.
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3 Contrary to many classic works (Davison 1981; Lewis 1968) that analyze the Kemalist
period in light of the state reforms that aimed to create ‘new citizens’ (İrem 2002), this
article claims both that the Turkish elites interacted with society –including dissident
groups– and thus were not members of an ‘autonomous’ entity (i.e., the state), and that
Turkish society was capable of articulating dissent challenging the hegemonic designs
of the state. In particular, some Kurdish segments within and outside Turkey were able
to challenge Turkish state authority in the international arena.
4 Concretely, the article first deals with the dynamics that limited the autonomy of the
Turkish state,  in particular in the 1920s.  It  then suggests that the Turkish regime’s
response to these constraints was to put in place extremely violent policies concerning
the inhabitants of the Eastern provinces. In so doing, it contributed in a paradoxical
and progressive manner to the creation of a specific ‘territorial’ and ‘cultural’ entity:
‘the East’ or ‘Eastern Anatolia,’ understood, beyond the geographic reality, at once as
the location of actual armed resistance and the representation of a region intrinsically
conservative  and  counter-revolutionary.  Indeed,  while  the  Kemalist  regime  was
affirming the ethnic homogeneity of Turkey and the equal treatment of its ‘Turkish
citizens,’ it was contributing, with these very practices, to the creation of non-physical
‘borders’ separating the West and the East of the country.
5 I  show that at the same time, in spite of the strong ideological commitment of the
Kemalist  elites,  Turkish  authorities  were  obliged  to  take  into  consideration  the
dissenting discourses elaborated by Kurdish intellectuals who were in exile in Syria and
Lebanon  after  the  establishment  of  the  Turkish  republic.  Using  archival  material,
newspapers, pamphlets and other materials published during the 1920s and 1930s, it is
possible  to  see  that  the  Kurdish  intellectuals  who  organized  around  the  Khoybun
committee (1927-1943) became “legitimate” representatives of the Kurdish opposition
to the Kemalists,  in part due to the relative freedom of action in the Levant under
French mandate. 
6 The paper thus demonstrates that dissident actors challenge the so-called ‘autonomous
status’ of states in the international arena. Contemporary history tell us that different
dissident movements have succeeded both in challenging the legitimacy of the states or
regimes  concerned  by  way  of  the  increased  diasporization  of  their  groups,  and  in
gaining legitimacy, both in their respective countries and internationally. The Kurdish
experience  in  Syria  and  Lebanon  is  in  that  sense  one  of  the  first  instances  of
diasporization in the twentieth century.2
7 Through the  analysis  of  Kurdish  pamphlets  and  journals  I  note,  however,  that  the
opposite is also true. Kurdish intellectuals lacking ideological tools such as schools or a
‘national’ army were often constrained in their response to Turkish state propaganda.
In other words, though carrying a message concerning an ‘us’ –the ‘Kurdish national
community’–  Kurdish  intellectuals  were  not  independent  of  state  categories:  the
research of an ancient and golden age, the ‘purity’ of language, the ‘homogeneity’ of
society, the ‘civilized’ we-group as opposed to the ‘Barbarian’ other, among others. In so
doing,  both  groups  of  actors  contributed,  albeit  with  different  goals,  to  a  ‘shared’
political production of ‘the East’ as a sphere of ‘resistant’ culture. 
8 More  generally,  studying  the  Kemalist  period  through  the  lens  of  the  interaction
between the Turkish state and the Kurdish movement provides a means to extend the
‘state-in-society’ framework developed by Joel S. Migdal (2001) in order to answer the
question of how cultural, political, and religious spaces are constructed, reshaped, and
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eventually  politicized  as  an  outcome  of  the  struggle  between  the  state  and  some
segments of a given society for symbolic imposition. Indeed, the politicization3 of the
‘East,’ which resulted from the activities and intellectual endeavors of both the Turkish
state and the Kurdish elites, has had a long-term impact. As the contemporary history
of Turkey has shown, the construction of the ‘East’ as a politicized space has persisted
remarkably well both in state discourse and within Kurdish activist circles. 
9 True,  the  Kurdish  dissident  movement failed  to  achieve  Kurdish  independence  or
political autonomy in Turkey. However, the Turkish state did not obtain a complete
victory  over  the  movement.  After  the  Second World  War,  former  Kurdish  activists
wrote  memoirs,  and  thus  projected  ‘a  point  of  reference  in  a  long  “national”
temporality and transmitted the “flame” to future generations’ (Bozarslan 2007: 431). It
is was the end of the 1960s that the works of these ‘elders’ allowed a new generation
lacking points of reference to find a historic lineage (Bozarslan 2007: 431; Gündoğan
2005: 37-74; Watts 2007: 52-77). The young militants plunged into this ‘revolutionary
library’  to  find  answers  to  their  new  questions:  the  myths  of  a  rich  past  (Medes,
Saladin), a history marked by resistance to power –be it Ottoman or Turkish– and a
‘homogenous’ cultural identity (Strohmeier 2003: 199-203). 
10 Some  elements  of  the  ‘doctrine’  produced  by  the  ‘elders’  were  then  re-used  to
legitimize a ‘national’ struggle with a strong Marxist accent. Whereas the Westernized
intellectuals organized around the Khoybun committee in the 1920s and 1930s asserted
that Kurds were ‘civilized’ and more ‘modern’ than Turks, the new generation claimed
the  contrary:  Kurds  lived  in  a  ‘backward’  region,  the  ‘East,’  and  were  victims  of
‘traditional  exploitation’  (e.g.  landowners  and  religious  chiefs)  and,  particularly,  of
state  policies.  Interestingly,  state  discourse  did  not  change,  for  Turkish  officials
continued to perceive the Kurdish question as a matter of regional backwardness. As
they had in the 1920s and 1930s, state elites and Kurdish activists in the 1960s and
1970s contributed to a shared production of the ‘East’ as a particular political entity.
The present article sheds light on this entity by looking at both the historical context
and the dynamics that led to the politicization of the ‘East’ during the Kemalist era.
 
I. The Relative Autonomy of the Kemalist State
11 The creation of the modern Turkish state in the 1920s has often been described as a
‘race to reform’ (Dumont 1997: 155), with the abolition of the caliphate, banning of the
fez, emancipation of women and the adoption of the Latin alphabet, all of which aimed
to bury the Ottoman past and bring about a new Turkey. In the end –so the narrative
goes– Turkey emerged victorious on the international level after having managed to
replace the treaty of Sèvres (1920),4 which was heavily constraining for Turkey, with
the treaty of  Lausanne (1923).  In doing this,  the Turkish leaders became their  own
masters, and masters of their national unity. Guided by an iron fist and legitimized
internationally,  Kemalist  Turkey  could,  as  of  then,  follow  its  unstoppable  march
towards ‘modernity.’ The true picture is somewhat more blurred. 
12 First,  the  Sèvres  treaty,  and  in  particular  the  clauses  relating  to  the  creation  of
Armenian and Kurdish states in the oriental provinces of Anatolia, imposed political
and psychological ‘boundaries’ to which the Kemalist leaders had to adapt. Hence, the
series of treaties and international accords signed by Turkey after 1919 had important
repercussions for the definition of Turkish national identity (İçduygu & Kaygusuz 2004:
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26-50). Indeed, the foreign affairs of a state do not only decide the conventions and
accords  that  delineate  the  ‘community  inside’  as  opposed  to  ‘foreigners,’  they  also
secure the boundaries of a particular national identity ‘through a specific concept of
“national” security which domesticates a particular identity to be secured’ (İçduygu &
Kaygusuz 2004: 29).  The Sèvres Treaty was in this sense a decisive turning point;  it
buried both the Ottomanist and Pan-Turanian projects and limited the new Turkey to a
territory where the Turkish and Muslim elements would dominate. 
13 Nevertheless, the ‘East’ became the ‘fortress’ of the new Turkish state. As a borderline,
the Eastern provinces had to be fully integrated into the state framework in order to
face external threats, namely the establishment of an ‘enemy’ Armenian state as well as
a Kurdish state ‘at the orders’ of foreign powers (i.e., Great Britain, due to its presence
in Iraq as a Mandatory power). These concerns led the Kemalists to try to ‘win’ the
Eastern  provinces  of  Anatolia,  and  at  the  same  time  it  led  to  the  emergence  of  a
security-based vision of the ‘Eastern’ provinces (Yerasimos 1991: 31).
14 In this sense, the acquisition of the vilayet of Mosul –where Kurds formed the main
‘minority’  group– was essential.  If  Turkey succeeded in controlling former Ottoman
territories where significant Kurdish populations lived, the threat of a Kurdish state
would disappear. In the tense context of the Turko-British negotiations over the status
of the vilayet of Mosul, the Turkish National Assembly tried to win the hearts of the
Kurdish populations by issuing a decree providing for the creation of a local Kurdish
Assembly on 7 July 1923. This Turkish initiative also sought to convince the League of
Nations  of  the  ‘traditional’  good  relations  between  Turks  and  Kurds.  Although  the
autonomy suggested for the provinces with Kurdish majorities was limited, the decree
nevertheless called for the use of the Kurdish language (Ali 2001-2002: 37). However,
once the treaty of  Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923,  with sovereignty over the
Eastern provinces of Anatolia thus assured, Kemalist leaders set aside all projects for
Kurdish autonomy. During the diplomatic negotiations on the future of the vilayet of
Mosul,  the  Turkish  representatives  emphasized  the  idea  of  ‘sameness,’  the  ‘shared
origin’ of Turks and Kurds, as a pretext to secure Turkish control over this area.
15 In spite of the weakness of the Kurdish nationalist movement in the early 1920s, the
threat of Kurdish separatism began to impose itself on the minds of Turkish leaders.
The revolt  of  Sheikh Said of Piran in 1925 (Olson 1989) further fed these fears and
nurtured the view of the East as ‘other,’ as simultaneously ‘door’ and ‘fortress’ of the
Turkish ‘nation.’5 If the Lausanne Treaty brought a certain stability to Turkey’s borders,
the ‘Eastern’ question, seen in a security perspective, was present in Turkish foreign
policy throughout the 1920s and 1930s, sometimes creating diplomatic tensions with
neighboring  states:  from  Iraq  under  British  Mandate  between  1922-1925  (Edmonds
1957: 386-435) to Syria under French mandate between 1920-33 (Mizrahi 2003: 115-149;
Tatchjian 2004: 307-347), including Iran during the Kurdish revolt of Ağrı-Dağ between
1927-31 (Olson 1998: 93-95; Tejel Gorgas 2007: 244-261).
16 In  addition,  the  Kemalist  regime  of  the  1920s  and  1930s  was  far  from  capable  of
monopolizing the symbolic capital of legitimacy or recognition (Bourdieu 1991: 230).
The national culture (Bourdieu 1994: 115), created by legal and linguistic norms and
promoted  by  the  new  elites,  was  not  shared  by  all  citizens.  If  Mustafa  Kemal  did
regulate formal political participation effectively, he was less successful in putting an
end  to  alternative  bonds  (local,  ethnic  and  religious)  that  engendered  competitive
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channels of collective action, and therefore identity, which partly escaped state control
(Brockett 1998: 47).
17 Indeed,  Mustafa  Kemal’s  Turkey  had  to  face  non-violent  resistance  from  its  own
‘citizens’ in Kayseri,  Erzurum, Maraş  (1925) and Bursa (1933), and violent dissent in
Rize, Elazığ-Diyarbakır (1925), Ağrı-Dağ (1927-1931), Menemen (1930), and in the region
of Dersim (1936-1938).6 In the Eastern provinces the Turkish military was forced to
intervene  in  order  to  put  down no  less  than 16  uprisings  between 1923  and 1938.
However, only three revolts (Sheikh Said, Ağrı-Dağ and Dersim) had explicitly Kurdish
nationalist  claims  and  were  organized  by  Kurdist  committees  or  individuals.  More
significantly, the latter three revolts obliged the Turkish state to mobilize thousands of
soldiers as well as to spend a significant part of the national budget in order to stamp
out the dissent emanating from the Eastern provinces of the country. Still, even these
“nationalist” uprisings were interlinked with other motivations, in particular religious
and tribal (Bozarslan 1988: 121-136; Bozarslan 1991: 61-80; Bruinessen 1992: 278-305;
Kieser 1998: 279-316; Olson 1989; Watts 2000: 5-30).
 
II. Making the ‘East’
18 Indeed, the Kemalist regime officially labeled these revolts ‘reactionary,’ ‘obscurantist’
and  ‘feudal’7 (Bruinessen  1992:  298-299;  Bruinessen  1994:  141-170;  Jwaideh  2006:
203-211; Olson 1989: 124) Watts 2000: 5-30) resulting from the actions of a few tribal
chiefs  who  were  motivated  by  irrational  forces.  Turkish  elites  considered  the
opposition  movements  originating  from  the  Eastern  provinces  illegitimate,  as  they
were seen as representing obstacles to ‘civilization’ and ‘progress’ and thus were open
to severe punishment: ‘dissent was to leave; to leave was to betray’ (Salamé 1994: 23).
19 The Turkish regime’s reaction to the rebellion was brutal. The destruction of hundreds
of villages8 and the deportation of hundreds of Kurdish nobility towards the Western
provinces of Turkey was legitimized by the press loyal to the regime, which presented
Sheikh Said as a ‘bandit’ and his followers as ‘dogs,’ ‘jackals’ or even ‘convinced valets
of  [British]  imperialism’  (Erdoğan  2001-2002:  49-56).9 Furthermore,  a  campaign  of
‘Turkifying’  the  Kurdish  regions  was  organized  (Aslan  2007:  245-272).  The  Kurdish
language was targeted from 1924 onward with a ban on Kurdish schools, associations
and  publications  (Seal  1995:  238),  and  use  of  the  terms  ‘Kurd’  and  ‘Kurdistan’  in
scientific discourse was prohibited the same year (Akin 1998-2000: 52). In the linguistic
arena,  the Kurdish  names  of  villages,  mountains  and  towns  were  also  ‘Turkified’
(Öktem 2004: 7-21; 2009). The suppression of the Kurdish language and culture became,
in  fact,  one  of  the  integral  components  of  the  strategy  for  constructing  a  Turkish
national identity based on uniformity and indivisibility (Beşikçi 1990: 132; Vali 1998: 84;
İçduygu, Yılmaz & Soyarık 1999: 194-195).
20 In 1928, the Kemalist regime established the position of General Inspectorate under the
leadership of İbrahim Tali, and gave this vali exceptional administrative, political and
military power in the Eastern provinces. In the same vein, following the Ağrı-Dağ or
Ararat revolt, the regime in Ankara created two new general inspectorates as well as
pro-governmental militias, and promulgated a new law (No. 2237, 5 May 1932) which
provided for the deportation of parts of the Kurdish population of the Eastern vilayets
to the western vilayets (Azizan 1934). 
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21 The virulence of Kemalist policies in the Eastern provinces contrasts, however, with the
relatively moderate positions held by the ‘dissidents’ at the time. For example, after the
uprising of 1925, Ankara sent a delegate to the rebel chiefs to discuss their demands.
Despite  state  propaganda  about  the  ‘obscurantist’  character  of  the  insurgents,  the
demands put forth did not present any serious danger to the foundations of the young
republic: general amnesty for the prisoners engaged in the uprising of 1925, the right of
return to their homes, exemption from taxes of the agricultural populations, and the
cancellation of the decree imposing disarmament on the Kurds who, in the case of war,
would be forced to provide voluntary corps not exceeding 40 percent of the population.
10 It is worth mentioning that the nationalist committee Azadî, which was responsible
for the organization of the Kurdish uprising, had presented moderate grievances to the
Kemalist authorities before the revolt  erupted, such as minority rights that already
applied to Christians and the nomination of government officials of Kurdish origin in
the Eastern provinces (Olson 1989: 43-45).
22 It should also be noted at the same time that within the Turkish administration, the
Kemalist cadres did not all believe in the same approach for resolving the question of
the  ‘Eastern  vilayets.’  Indeed,  after  having  tried  to  ‘pacify’  Eastern  Turkey  through
coercion, the Inspector General İbrahim Tali came to the conclusion, in accord with
certain Kurdish deputies, that a change of attitude was needed to obtain the definite
appeasement of these regions. At the end of October 1928, Tali traveled to Ankara to
explain  his  program.  He  advocated  putting  in  place  a system  of  administrative
autonomy and decentralization that was to rely on the collaboration of the Kurdish
leadership.  Thus,  the  Inspector  General  considered  it  possible  to  promote  a  purely
regional  military  recruitment  and  to  give  the  majority  of  public  service  jobs  to
inhabitants of the regions concerned. Finally, Tali argued for ‘sensitivity’ in
assimilating the Kurds, levying taxes on them, and applying ‘republican’ laws.11 
23 In order to justify this reversal in Ankara’s policies towards the Eastern provinces, İ
brahim Tali pointed out that, either way, taxes were being collected ‘only with great
difficulty  from  the  centers  and  the  countryside  refused  to  pay  them.’  Moreover,
conscription only fed the ranks of deserters who, incidentally, went to join the rebels in
the  mountains,  thus  increasing  their  technical  expertise.  Finally,  far  from growing
closer to the government of Ankara, it was to neighboring countries (Iraq, Iran and
Syria) that ‘the Kurds of Turkey were turning and it is abroad that they asked for help.’
12 İbrahim  Tali’s  appeals  were  not  listened  to.  What  is  more,  a  robust  program  of
‘Turkification’  was adopted and,  ‘to help and maybe oversee the Inspector General,
whose liberalism seemed excessive, General Ali Fuat Paşa, who had the full trust of Gazi
and the General Staff, was named at the head of the Army Corps of Diyarbakır.’13
24 The  collection  of  exceptional  measures  implemented  against  thousands  of  Kurds,
whether or not they were directly implicated in the armed movements,14 contributed to
the delimitation of a non-physical ‘border’ separating the West from the East, which
from then on was seen from both sides of the ‘border’ as a specific region portrayed as
possessing a homogeneity that did not really exist.  The ‘East’  became a territory of
refuge  for  an  intrinsically  counter-revolutionary  popular  culture.  In  this  respect,
Kurdish identity  (language,  social  structures,  attachment to  religious brotherhoods)
was held forth as a symbol of otherness and politicized by the state itself.15 In other
words,  following  Suaud’s  analysis  of  the  Vendée,  the  ‘East’  and  ‘its”’  overlapping
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‘Kurdishness’ began to symbolize what the Turkish elites deemed ‘illegitimate on the
political, economic, social and cultural levels’ (Suaud 1997: 8).
25 The inhabitants of the ‘East’ were henceforth perceived by the Kemalist cadres and the
officials  on  the  ground  through  a  double  prism:  on  the  one  hand,  Kurds  were
stigmatized  as  ‘backward,’  having  remained  on  the  sidelines  of  civilization;  on  the
other hand, they were also seen as ‘Turkish’ citizens who, with a bit of help, could
rejoin the path of progress (Yeğen 1996: 216-229). Thus, the Turkish Hearths16 [Türk
Ocakları] were given the mission, after the Sheikh Said revolt, to ‘make Turkish’17 the
inhabitants of the Eastern provinces (Aslan 2008). 
26 To  do  this,  the  cadres  of  the  Hearths  thought  that  one  first  had  to  ‘know’  the
population; they took an interest in the Kurdish question and had works concerning
the Kurds translated. Some ‘researchers’ went further, and wrote reports on the Kurds
without digging deeper to get to know the Eastern populations. However, the Turkish
officials  posted  to  the  Eastern  provinces  organized  what  Suaud,  writing  on  the
expertise  of  French  officials  sent  to  Vendée,  calls  a  ‘unified,  stigmatized  and
naturalized image’ (Suaud 1997: 9) of ‘the Kurd.’ In so doing, state elites contributed to
the  construction  of  a  collective  social  representation  of  the  Kurdish  identity.  For
example, in a declaration to the newspaper Cumhuriyet in 1930, Othman Mazhar (Kansu)
emphasized the impossibility of the government’s civilizing task in the ‘East’ as he was
convinced that it was impossible ‘to destroy the black soul, that crass sensibility, that
blood-thirsty instinct, among the Kurdish masses.’18
 
III. Contradictions within the State
27 Othman Mazhar’s declarations suggest that despite the regime’s official attachment to
‘revolutionism’ –in other words, the desire to pursue reforms regardless of the costs– a
portion of the Turkish officials considered, at least unconsciously,  the ‘East’  and its
inhabitants as intrinsically refractory and difficult to drive towards ‘civilization.’ Faced
with these ‘insurmountable’ obstacles, certain segments of the Turkish state distanced
themselves  from  the  Kemalist  regime’s  ‘modernization’  program  for  the  Eastern
provinces, this ‘other’ territory. Put in other words, in some cases state employees and
representatives in Eastern provinces ‘betrayed’ the ideological commitment and sought
an accommodation to the prevailing [backward] social ‘reality.’ The Kemalist state was
thus, as are most states, a site of contradiction between the two elements that shaped
its  image (of  a  dominant  and  autonomous  entity)  and  practices (or  the  routine
performance of state actors and agencies) (Migdal 2001: 16-23). 
28 In this respect, the official report signed by Abeddin Özmen, the Interior Ministry’s
inspector posted to the Eastern provinces during the Dersim revolt (1936-1938), sheds
some  light  on  the  contradictions  in  the  state’s  administration  between  the  openly
expressed objectives  and the means it  gave itself  to  achieve them.  Abeddin Özmen
suggested  that  the  Kurd,  ‘whatever  the  reason  may  be,  is  not  used  to  regular
government,  neither the reality nor the concept.’  For a Kurd,  he argued,  ‘the most
powerful person is the chief of the tribe, the village chief, the man who owns the fields
in  which  he  works  and  the  cattle  which  he  rears.’19 In  this  brief  ‘ethnographic’
description,  we  again  find  the  elements  mentioned  above:  the  backward  Kurd
associated with the  rural  world,  and the ‘mountain Turk,’  a  neologism invented to
designate the Kurds in the 1930s and linked ‘naturally’  to reactionary [irtica]  chiefs
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(Akin 1998/2000:  51-60;  Nezan 1978:  104-105;  Olson 1989:  123-125).  In  this  way,  the
inspector affirms that the region he administers ‘has no resemblance to other parts of
the country’ and that the regime should therefore energetically apply itself to finding a
‘solution to the problem of assimilation.’
29 However, Abbedin Özmen ‘painfully’ regrets Ankara’s policy towards the officials sent
to  the  ‘East.’  Firstly,  officials  in  the  Western  vilayets,  ‘whose  removal  would  be
necessary [due to their poor engagement and even some irregular activities], are sent
to the Eastern vilayets.’20 The result of this lack of rigor on behalf of the government was
that the Eastern citizens did not trust the state. Secondly, for Özmen, the state was not
really interested in the mission on which the agents of the state work. State officials
were  obliged  to  work  in  very  difficult  conditions  in  the  Eastern  provinces:  lack  of
offices or official buildings; lack of housing and schools for the children of officials.21 In
the face of this ‘hard situation,’ some state employees showed little enthusiasm in their
job. In summary, the consequence of this negligence on the part of the government in
Ankara  was  that  the  ‘civilizational’  mission  of  the  Kemalist  project  in  the  Eastern
provinces could not be fully accomplished. 
30 The concerns of this zealous Turkish official are confirmed by other data. Indeed, the
geographical  spread  of  the  Millet  Mektepleri [Schools  of  the  Nation],  which  were
designed to diffuse the new Latin alphabet to the Turkish population, illustrates the
disinvestment of the state in the Eastern provinces with effects –such as the failure of
the  cultural  assimilation  policy  in  the  years  1920-1930–  that  contradict  the  official
Turkish  government  propaganda.  Between  1928  and  1935,  the  best  equipped
administrative region was Marmara, which was home to 31.1 percent of the schools
between  1928  and  1935  (a  third  of  which  were  in  the  vilayet of  Istanbul),  whilst
southeast  Anatolia  comes  in  last  with  2.8  percent.  As  Birol  Çaymaz and Emmanuel
Szurek deduce, this imbalance draws ‘the political territory of access to knowledge –a
territory which marginalizes Eastern Anatolia and the Southeast, the location of the
Kurdish revolts in the 1920s and the areas most reluctant to accept the imposition of
the republican order’ (Çaymaz and Szurek 2007: § 71).
31 This  state  of  affairs  confirms  Reşat  Kasaba’s  accounts  of  the  single-party  period.
According to Kasaba, in the 1920-1930s, the Turkish state was still in the making, and
although  it  tried  to  deal  with  all  social  and  political  challenges  that  emerged,  its
policies were not always ‘coherent or consistent’ (Kasaba 2000: 4). To make things more
complicated, some of these challenges did not arise in Turkey itself but abroad. During
the 1920s-1940s, Kurdish rights were pursued not only in Turkey but also in consulates
and offices in Germany, France, Great Britain, Iran, Italy, Switzerland, the United States
of  America,  and  especially  in  Syria  and  Lebanon  (Rondot  1946;  1949;  Tejel  Gorgas:
148-166). In spite of the limited results of this activity, the Turkish state was obliged to
react to those challenges and take into consideration an alternative discourse on the
‘Eastern question.’
 
IV. Voices of Dissent
32 Social scientists have underlined that the state is not only embodied in the ‘objective’
form of structures but also in the ‘subjective’ form of mental structures, ‘schemes of
perception and thought’ (Bourdieu 1994: 107). As portrayed in a wide range of analyses,
the  state  –often  depicted  as  one  monolithic  entity–  creates  mental  structures  and
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imposes fundamental visions, contributing to the construction of what is designated as
‘national identity’ through institutions such as school and the army. The state is also
seen as powerful enough to construct identities in order to attain certain objectives:
return  national  identity  to  the  forefront,  reconfigure  national  identity,  nationalize
national identity,  and assimilate ‘minorities’  (Norman 2004:  133-135).  In the end,  in
these analyses, we again find the idea that the state is autonomous from society and is
situated in the ‘center’ of the system, whereas society, a passive receptor, is situated on
its ‘periphery’ (Shils 1975).
33 In contrast to this vision, I  suggest that if  the state can count on a whole range of
institutional tools to achieve the ‘nationalization of citizens,’ dissenting groups can also
work to create an antagonistic social representation (Moscovici 1996), and thus begin to
compete on the symbolic level as well. The fight for hegemony between the state and
dissident  movements  (ethnic,  feminist,  ecologist,  etc.)  can  be  more  or  less  equal,
despite an inequity in the distribution of resources clearly favoring the former (Aslan
2008;  Belge  2008;  Watts  2004:  121-147).  The  present  case  demonstrates  that  some
movements  can participate  in  shaping a  political  space  in  spite  of  their  relative
‘weakness’ in a particular moment.
34 After  the  Sheikh Said  insurrection was  crushed in  1925,  members  of  Kurdish clubs
based in Istanbul were forced into exile, fleeing repression by the new Turkish regime.
While some of them found refuge in Iraq, others looked for the protection of France in
the  Levant.  Some  exiled  Kurdish  intellectuals  worked  to  reorganize  the  Kurdish
associations in the Lebanese town Bihamdun in 1927.22 The result of these efforts, the
Khoybun League, represented the realization of the ‘unnatural marriage’ between, on
the one hand, a westernized intelligentsia, and on the other hand, the representatives
of the Kurdish nobility: aghas, sheikhs and tribal chiefs.23 
35 The  Khoybun  League  especially  invested  in  political  propaganda24 and  political
contacts, for the most part unofficial, both with state actors (Iran, France, Great Britain,
Italy, USSR), and non-state actors (the Armenian movements, and Turkish opposition
members25). In doing so, the Khoybun managed to insert itself, with the help of France,
into the system of politico-military alliances, and thanks to this became an important
regional actor during, for example, the revolt of Ararat. 
36 At the same time, as Hamit Bozarslan emphasizes, due to the limitation of their forces,
the Kurdish elites in exile were forced to be ‘at the same time the political and the
military leadership of the nationalist revolts and the producer of their political and
ideological discourse’ (Bozarslan 2001: 58). The Khoybun’s propaganda was principally
aimed at  Kurdish refugees  in  Syria  to  dissuade them from listening to  the Turkish
promises of amnesty; it varied, however, as the themes put forth and the language used
changed depending on the audience.
37 The early Kurdish nationalists’  background was not very different from the Turkish
one. Like their Turkish counterparts, the leaders of the Khoybun had been educated in
modern Ottoman schools and associations in Istanbul, where they expressed their wish
to  lead  the  Kurds  toward  western  civilization  and  declared  the  necessity  of
modernizing Kurdish society ‘from the top-down.’ However, once the Kurds failed to
obtain their independence in the aftermath of the First World War, Kurdish activists
were forced to adapt their political and ideological discourse to different targets. 
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38 This is well illustrated by a letter by Sureya Bedir Khan to Kamuran Bedir Khan and
intercepted  by  the  General  Security  as  Sureya  Bedir  Khan  was  preparing  the
publication of a brochure entitled ‘The Kurdish question, its origins and its causes.’ He
explains to his brother that ‘the brochure in the Persian language will deal with the
weakening of the Aryan race […].’ In order to counter this danger, there should be an
‘Aryan Confederation’ uniting the Kurds,  Armenians and Persians,  presided by Iran.
However, the Arab brochure was to deal with ‘our numerous services rendered to the
Islamic and Arab causes.’ Finally, the French brochure would deal with ‘the history of
our  revolutions  and  insurrections  […]  foreigners’  opinions  of  us  and  the  duties
incumbent on civilized Europe.’26
39 Likewise,  and  despite  the  intellectual  baggage  heavily  saturated  with  the  ideals  of
modernization  and  secularization,  the  Khoybun  didn’t  hesitate  to  use  religious
terminology to mobilize tribes and brotherhoods from the Eastern provinces in their
call for revolution against the Turkish regime, which they depicted as endangering ‘our
religion and the honor of the Kurdish nation.’ Thus, the Khoybun looked to the Qur’an
to justify the revolution: ‘God, source of glory, did he not say to us in the Qur’an: Walk
for Justice,  you will  find me with you? Let us not fear the spilling of our blood for the
religion, the nation and the safeguard of our honor, with the firm conviction that God
is  on our side.’27 Clearly,  the Kurdish nationalist  movement was not  operating in a
vacuum. As the Azadî committee did during the Sheikh Said revolt, Khoybun leaders
attempted to mobilize followers and exercise power in arenas in which other social
forces (sheikhs, aghas and tribal chiefs) were doing the same. 
 
V. The Interactive Shaping of Social Representations
40 The Khoybun League’s discourse did not build itself autonomously. It also thought of
itself as an opposition to the exterior enemies and became part of a mirror effect, in a
dynamic relationship with the other, the Turk.
41 If  at  the beginning of the Turkish Republic Kemalist  policies regarding the Kurdish
populations caused little reaction on the part of the Kurdish elites,28 the physical and
symbolic violence29 that followed the Sheikh Said revolt in 1925 changed things. In a
complex  interaction  with  the  physical  and  symbolic  violence  of  the  Turkish  state,
Kurdish nationalists started to elaborate an equally virulent discourse: ‘We repeat, the
struggle will be hard, bloody; but IT WILL END ONLY WITH THE LAST BULLET AND THE
LAST KURD’ (Hoyboun 1928: 41). 
42 While Kemalism qualified Kurdism as ‘feudal’ and ‘reactionary,’ Kurdish intellectuals
affirmed that the Kurdish nation was civilized, and that it was the Turks, ‘Mongols,’
who belonged to the ‘barbaric’ nations (Bozarslan 2001: 60). In the same way, while the
Kurdish periodicals of the Ottoman Empire lamented the backwardness of the Kurds,
deploring  in  particular  the  plight  of  Kurdish  women  (Klein  2001:  25-51),  Khoybun
activists  claimed  that  Kurdish  women  had  more  freedom  than  their  female
counterparts in the Middle East.
43 Khoybun members worked hard to paint the Turks as ‘barbarians’  and ‘assassins of
Christians,’  and  also  to  demonstrate  that  the  Kurds  under  Turkish  rule  found
themselves in the role of victim, becoming a ‘martyr nation,’ with statistics to prove it
(Hoyboun 1928: 62-68; Chirguh 1930: 49-52). In the face of Turkish policy, the Khoybun’s
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discourse clearly aimed to create boundaries between ‘us’ (the Kurds) and ‘them’ (the
Turks);  a  necessary  step  in  any  conflict  before  being  able  to  construct  a  ‘political
entity.’ The elaboration of boundaries between two groups is a complex process, but
once they exist, they become part of the usual arsenal for political actors. While the
boundary is ‘activated,’ it constitutes, ‘coupled with the relations that are attached to
it, a social identity’ (Tilly & Tarrow 2008: 138). 
44 Nevertheless, if these Kurdish intellectuals were responding to a certain extent to the
civilizational syntax elaborated by the Turkish elite in the 1930s, ‘Turkishness’ was also
constructed in relation to the ‘others’ by state elites. In other words, the image of the
‘backward’ Kurd helped to construct Turkish identity as the ‘new Turk,’ civilized and
modern.  The  opposition  between  Turkish  and  Kurdish  nationalism  compelled  both
elites to continually adapt their discourse in contrast to their ‘enemy.’ Hence, a kind of
mimicry, in a double sense, was established between the ‘dominant’ (the Turkish state)
and the ‘oppressed’ (the Kurdish dissent movement).
 
VI. The Struggle for Discursive Legitimacy
45 Anatolian  people’s  resistance  to  state  policies,  along  with  the  cultural  diversity  of
Turkey and the dissenting voices of the Kurdish nationalists, drove Turkish elites to
look for a ‘scientific’ legitimacy for their project of homogenizing and civilizing the
nation.  Like their European and Eastern counterparts,  Turkish ideologues turned in
particular to the past to nourish the new state discourse. The ‘reform’ of history in
Turkey began in 1930 with the publication of The General Themes of Turkish History,  a
work that looks in particular at prehistory and ancient history, and was aimed at school
children. In 1931, the History Commission was replaced by the Committee for the Study
on Turkish History, controlled by Mustafa Kemal’s followers, who organized the first
Congress on Turkish History in Ankara in July 1932. The aim of the congress was indeed
to legitimize the new thesis on the ‘Turkish’ origin of all civilizations, and therefore, all
languages  and  peoples,  including  the  Kurds.  In  order  to  support  the  Kemalist
ideologues’  claims with ‘scientific proof,’  the historical theses were accompanied by
linguistic arguments between 1932-35. These arguments later became part of the ‘Sun-
Language Theory’ (1936) which reaffirmed the claims of the new Turkish history: the
Turkish origin of all languages and all civilizations in the world (Aytürk 2004: 1-25). The
‘Sun-Language Theory’ did not gain the sympathy of all Turkish scholars. However, the
real criticism arose not in Turkey, but in Syria, where the Khoybun’s members pursued
their ‘international advocacy.’
46 While part of the nationalist propaganda of the Khoybun League addressed the Kurds in
Syria and Turkey, the larger effort was directed towards the superrecipient (Copeaux
1997: 34): the potential political and military allies –Great Britain, France, Iran and to a
lesser extent the Arabs– and the political enemy par excellence, Kemalist Turkey. The
intellectual work of Khoybun, however, changed from the early 1930s onward for two
reasons.  First,  the  failure  of  the  Ağrı-Dağ  revolt  (1927-1931)  demonstrated  the
uselessness  of  sporadic  revolts  against  Turkey  without  the  support  of  either  Great
Britain or France. Second, the Kemalist projects for the reform of Turkish history and
language posed new challenges for Kurdish identity, whose very existence in Turkey
was denied. 
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47 These two factors drove the Bedir Khan brothers to change their strategy, abandoning
the ‘sword’ for the ‘pen.’ The leaders of the Khoybun, in particular the two Bedir Khan
brothers Celadet and Kamuran, argued that there was an urgent need to consolidate
the  feeling  of  belongingness  in  the  Kurdish  community,  by  restoring  the  Kurdish
language,  developing  teaching  in  Kurdish,  and  ensuring  the  rebirth  of  popular
literature.  Supported  by  French  officers,  the  Bedir  Khan  brothers  invested  in  the
publication  of  cultural  journals30 in  order  to  create  ‘real  Kurds’  who  knew  their
language and past (Tejel Gorgas 2007: 267-307). This strategic reversal of the Kurdish
ideologues also brought about a change in the tone and objectives of the brochures
elaborated after the defeat of  the Ağrı-Dağ  revolt.  The warrior discourse developed
between 1928 and 1931 by the Khoybun was replaced by ‘scientific’ arguments looking
to refute the ‘scientific’ theses produced by the government in Ankara and the projects
of cultural assimilation regarding the Kurds. Hence, the Kurdish intellectuals worked to
‘prove’ the existence of Kurds as a specific ethno-linguistic group, and to present the
Kurdish inhabitants of the ‘East’ as a culturally homogenous region.
48 The best example of a response to Kemalist arguments on Turkish history and language
is a 1933 document of some fifty pages by Celadet Bedir Khan entitled ‘Open letter to
Mustafa Kemal, President of the Republic of Turkey.’ The document is presented as a
warning to Kurds who accept the offer of amnesty by the Turkish government in 1932,
but in fact the largest part of the text is dedicated to refuting the Kemalist theses on
the Kurdish language. Celadet Bedir Khan states that the Kurdish language is not a
dialect of Turkish, and compares grammars in order to demonstrate that Kurdish is
indeed  an  Indo-European  language.  Bedir  Khan  even  goes  so  far  as  to  try  to
demonstrate the proximity between German and Kurdish to affirm the ‘superiority’ of
the latter in comparison with Turkish (Bedir Khan 1973: 32-41). 
49 But Kurdish intellectuals did not just invest in the linguistic debate with the purpose of
claiming Kurdish uniqueness; they also became ‘explorers of the imaginary’ in order to
provide to the Kurdish ‘nation’  myths and symbols that would allow it,  on the one
hand, to resemble other nations in the world, and on the other hand, to create internal
cohesion. Among the founding myths, we can highlight those of Newroz (Kurdish new
year,  which  corresponds  to  the  beginning  of  Spring,  21  March),31 the  ‘national’
character  of  the  story Mem  û  Zîn written  by  Ahmedê  Khanî  in  the  17 th Century
(Bruinessen 2003: 40-57), and the drawing of historical lines between the Kurds and
their ‘ancestors’ the Medes, founders of an empire in the West of present-day Iran. 
 
VII. Dealing with Dissenting Voices
50 The amnesty offered by the Turkish government to the Kurdish dissidents in 1932 came
as  surprise.  Hamit  Bozarslan  (2006:  123)  highlights  the  apparent  paradox  that  the
openings came at  a  time when the Kemalist  regime seemed to  be consolidating its
position following the long period of  turbulence that  began with the effects  of  the
world economic crisis in 1929 and the demonstrations in favor of the outlawed Liberal
Party, continuing with the ‘incident’ of Menemen in 1930 and the final phase of the
Kurdish revolt around Ağrı-Dağ between 1930-31 (Nouri Pacha 1986). 
51 But can we consider the amnesty of 1932 a real opening towards the Kurdish nationalist
movement? The violent repression of the last holdouts of the Kurdish rebels around the
region of Ağrı-Dağ in 1932, the deportation law of May 1932 which particularly affected
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the population of Eastern Turkey, and the nationalist theses defended during the first
history congress that same year do not make it  seem like the Kemalist  regime was
seriously  interested  in  changing  its  policy  towards  the  ‘East.’  Rather,  the  Turkish
representatives’  overtures  towards  Kurdish  elites  between  1932  and  1935  can  be
understood  as  Ankara’s  desire  to  quiet  or  co-opt  dissenting  voices  that  had  made
themselves  heard  abroad,  preventing  the  consolidation  of  the  Turkish  nationalist
claims  as  a  hegemonic  ideology  as  much with  the  recipients  as  with  superrecipients:
embassies, consulates, and Orientalist libraries.32 In this sense, Ankara’s new policy was
quite successful. 
52 Born in Maden, Şükrü Mehmed Sekban (1881-1960) taught medicine in Istanbul and
joined the association Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti. In the Ottoman capital, Sekban became a
brilliant orator and was appreciated by the young Kurdish students there (Silopi 1991:
34). With the arrival of the Turkish Republic, he took refuge in Iraq and became the
representative of the Khoybun in Baghdad. In a radical reversal, Sekban later left Iraq
and published a piece in which he criticized his former companions and attacked the
basis of the Kurdish nationalist doctrine. In it, Sekban disputes the Aryan origins of the
Kurds,  stating  that  Turks  and  Kurds  are  of  the  ‘same  race,’  the  ‘Turanian’  family
(Sekban 1933: 27, 36), and invites the Kurds to follow the path Mustafa Kemal traced for
them in order to find ‘peace of mind and material prosperity’ (Sekban 1933: 38). Shortly
after the publication of his work ‘The Kurdish Question’ (1933), Ankara gave him an
amnesty.
53 Another case of the Kemalist regime co-opting members of the Kurdish opposition was
that of Massoud Fany. Originally from Sulaymaniya,  Massoud Fany was an Ottoman
official in the province of Adana. Anti-Kemalist until the end of the 1920s, he found
protection in Syria, where he applied for a government grant to study in France. In
spite of his links with the Kurdish movement in Syria,33 he wrote a doctoral thesis at
the  Sorbonne  in  1933  where  he  used  arguments  similar  to  those  put  forward  by
Mehmed Sekban the same year. Whilst reaffirming several times that the origins of the
Kurds were not clear, Fany came to the conclusion that the Kurds were Turanian like
the Turks (Fany 1933: 91). The author also showed himself to be heavily critical of the
Kurdish  movement,  who  were,  according  to  Fany,  controlled  by  the  British,  and
dedicated the last chapter of his thesis to openly attacking the Khoybun League. Like
Sekban, Massoud Fany received an amnesty and returned to Turkey.
54 The  two  motors  of  the  Kurdish  nationalist  movement  in  the  Levant,  Celadet  and
Kamuran Bedir  Khan,  were  also  contacted  by  Turkish  representatives.  In  1932,  the
Turkish Consul in Beirut met Kamuran Bedir Khan in private in a ‘friend’s house,’ after
six ‘urgent invitations.’34 Despite the failed first  attempt,  Turkish officials  remained
particularly interested in the intellectual work of the Bedir Khan brothers and tried to
contact them again several times in order to neutralize their symbolic dissent.35 
55 Thus, through the intermediary of the Turkish consul in Beirut, Şükri Bey –head of
General Security in Ankara and president of the Turkish delegation on the Permanent
mission of borders based in Damascus– met Celadet Bedir Khan in 1935. Significantly,
during their confidential meeting at the General Consulate of Turkey, Şükrü Mehmed
Sekban’s and Massoud Fany’s theses were among the central themes of the discussion.
After Şükri Bey lauded the works of Şükrü Mehmed Sekban, Celadet curtly responded:
‘If you are counting on these people you are going down the wrong road; furthermore,
if  you really thought they were useful  and disinterested,  you would be speaking to
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them  and  not  to  me.’36 Despite  the  various  impasses  in  a  rather  tense  discussion,
numerous propositions for a return to Turkey were apparently made to Celadet Bedir
Khan. 
56 After this meeting, amnesty offers by the Turkish representatives to the Bedir Khan
brothers stopped, probably for two reasons. First, thanks to the violent suppression of
the Dersim revolt (1936-1938), Turkey was not confronted with an organized movement
of dissent in the Eastern vilayets until the 1960s and 1970s (Gündoğan 2005; Watts 2007:
52-77). Secondly, the journal Hawar ceased publication between 1935 and 1941 due to
financial reasons. Kurdish intellectuals’ polemical interpretations (Licata, Klein & Van
der Linden 2006: 56-57) of the language and history of the Eastern vilayets thus ceased
to impair the hegemonic paradigm of the Kemalist elites.
 
Conclusions
57 While traditional accounts on Atatürk’s Turkey approach the state as a powerful and
centralized apparatus,  this article suggests,  on the contrary, that Turkey was still  a
state in the making and lacked a consistent policy in the face of the multiple social and
political challenges that emerged in the 1920 and 1930s.  While the Kemalist regime
presented itself as highly ideological and committed to ‘revolutionism,’ the reality was
more complex. 
58 First,  the international conjuncture of the interwar years led Turkish authorities to
seek  accommodation  between  their  principles  and  the  diplomatic  necessity  of
accepting the ‘loss’  of the Turanian territories.  Second, if the state elites aspired to
cultural hegemony through nationalizing the bodies and perceptions of the ‘Turkish’
populations,  this  goal  was  jeopardized  both  by  the  everyday  practices  of  the  state
apparatus and by the construction, albeit unconscious, of ‘areas of dissidence,’ namely
the ‘East,’ by the regime itself. In other words, whilst Kemalist ideologists considered
the Kurds as ethnic Turks and the East as a part of the motherland, they also viewed the
Eastern populations as anomalous and naturally resistant to modernity and civilization.
In so doing, they played a decisive role in the formation of a distinct cultural sphere
that overlapped imperfectly with a geographical space. 
59 Thirdly,  not  only  did  the  Turkish  state  have to  face  different  styles  of  everyday
resistance (survival of religious brotherhoods and tribal bonds, armed revolts, and use
of Kurdish language) within its borders; it also had to face challenges from places such
as Syria and Lebanon, where some Kurdish intellectuals had found protection. Thus,
the advantages of the contemporary transnational activism that offers ethnic groups
and diasporas important opportunities to become actors in the international arena are
not a completely new phenomenon. The French Mandate in the Levant allowed Kurdish
activists  to  maintain  relations  with  their  ‘home’:  Kemalist  authorities  and  Kurdish
communities  in  Turkey.  The  Kurdish  movement  in  Syria  succeeded  in  creating  a
transnational web of relations with different actors,  including foreign governments,
opposition groups, missionaries, journalists and Western scholars. In so doing, Kurdish
activists in Syria challenged not only Turkish state authority but also its legitimacy. 
60 Kurdish discourse was, nonetheless, not built autonomously. It developed in opposition
to the other, the Turk, and became part of a mirror effect, in a dynamic relationship
where  both  sides  contributed,  albeit  with  different  goals,  to  a  shared  political
production of ‘the East’ as a unique social and cultural sphere. All in all, the study of the
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Kemalist period through the lens of the ‘state-society’ approach advanced by scholars
like Joel Migdal (2001), Timothy Mitchell (1991: 77-96) or Tamir Moustafa (2000: 3-22)
proves to be extremely useful in accounting for the dynamic shaping and inter-shaping
of different social and political actors on the one hand, and the question of how spaces
become politicized as the result of the struggle of those actors, on the other.
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counter-revolutionary  movements  in  which  ‘conservative’  elements  (catholic  church
representatives and local nobility) played an important part. The cause was the decision of the
Convention of 23 February 1793 to conscript 300,000 men. 
2. For a similar argument, but applied to Kurdish activism in Western countries since the 1980s,
see Watts 2004: 121-147.
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representations (Lagroye 2003).
4. The Treaty of Sèvres provided for, inter alia, the creation of an Armenian State in what is now
north-east Turkey, as well as the establishment of a Kurdish state in the south-east of Turkey,
which could later join the former vilayet [province] of Mosul in northern Iraq. The treaty also
imposed the loss of Ottoman sovereignty over the Straits. 
5. Preface by the President of the Turkish Republic, Cemal Gürsel, to the work of M. Şerif Firat,
Doğu Illeri ve Varto Tarihi (1961). Quoted by Bozarslan 1988: 124.
6. For an analysis of collective public protests during the Kemalist period, in particular those
with religious characteristics, see Brockett 1998: 44-65.
7. Terms used by Ali Fuat Cebesoy in his political memoires, Siyasi Hatıralar (1952). Quoted by
Bozarslan 1988: 124.
8. The very official Turkish newspaper, Milliyet, in 1930 reported that ‘200 villages around Ercish
have been destroyed. Particularly in Pantos, no village remains.’ Milliyet, 16 July 1930.
9. For an analysis of the process of ‘animalization’ of certain groups or individuals in order to
legitimize physical violence, see Burgat 1999: 49-62.
10. CADN, Fonds Ankara, n° 92. Consulate of France (Tauris) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris).
Tauris, 28 May 1926. 
11. CADN,  Fonds Beyrouth,  n° 1055.  Consulate of  France (Adana) to Ministry of  Foreign Affairs
(Paris). Adana, 30 June 1930.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. An ‘unhappy Kurdish chief’ apparently told the French authorities: ‘If the government had
only punished those guilty after the Sheikh Said affair, the Kurds would have submitted, but the
men in Ankara massacred innocent people; it’s now a fight to the death between them and us.’
CADN, Fonds Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, n° 1054. Information n° 881/51. Beirut, 6 October 1927.
15. For a similar argument, see the study of the Palestinian case in Israel (Kemp 2004: 73-98).
16. Students  from  the  Military  Medical  School  and  Civil  Service  School,  as  well  as  some
intellectuals, established the first Turkish Hearths in 1912. Their aim was to advance the cultural,
educational and economical level of Turks and to strengthen their Turkish ‘common identity’.
During the Kemalist  period,  a  great  number of  branches were opened in Turkey and abroad
where lectures and courses about Turkish nationalism were organized (Üstel 1997).
17. PRO, FO 371/14579/E2678/44. Travel notes taken by W.S. Edmonds to A. Henderson, Istanbul,
21 May 1930.
18. Cited by Bozarslan 2006:125.
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19. PRO, FO 371/34977/E3090/65. Report annexed to the call of the National Khoybun League to his




22. Among the participants to this congress were:  Celadet Bedir Khan, Kamuran Bedir Khan,
Memduh Selim, Mustafa Şahin of Barazi, Fehmi Licî, Sheikh Mehdi (the brother of Sheikh Said),
Karim Suleymani, Emin Agha of Raman, Haco Agha of Heverkan and Khurşid bey (Soran 1992: 18).
23. For analyses of Kurdish nationalism in the late Ottoman era, see Janet Klein (2002) and Hakan
Özoğlu (2004).
24. In  addition  to  written  propaganda  (pamphlets,  posters,  etc.)  in  several  languages,  the
members of the Khoybun used techniques such as short propaganda films and records with songs
calling  for  anti-Kemalist  revolution.  CADN,  Fonds  Beyrouth,  Cabinet  Politique,  n°  1055.  General
Security. Beirut, 12 April 1930; CADN, Fonds Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, n° 571. General Security.
Beirut, 25 November 1936; respectively. 
25. The Committee of the Holy Revolution, which aimed to restore the caliphate in Turkey, and
the Armenian party Tashnak, created links to the Khoybun committee between 1927-1928. The
former minister of the interior Muhammad Ali Bey declared himself in favor of giving autonomy
to the Kurds and the Armenians in the framework of a confederation reuniting the three people.
However, the alliance between the three groups failed. CADN, Fonds Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, n°
1055. Letter by Muhammad Ali Bey to Radi Azmi Bey. Paris, 11 February 1928.
26. CADN, Fonds Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, n° 1055. General Security. Information n° 1985. Beirut,
22 August 1930.
27. CADN, Fonds Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, n° 1055. Pamphlet from the Khoybun committee (16
June 1932). Civil service. Aleppo, 23 May 1933.
28. An exception is Şükrü Mehmed Sekban, a member of the Kurdish Committee of Istanbul,
exiled in Iraq until the end of the 1920s, as evidenced by a letter titled ‘What do the Kurds want
from the Turks?’ (Kürdler Türkler’den ne istiyorlar), which sent to the (ethnic Kurdish) minister
Fevzi Pirinççizade of Diyarbakır in 1923. See the letter edited by Bayrak 1994: 26-39.
29. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Justice Minister in 1930, asserted that ‘Turks are the only masters and
owners of this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish stock have only one right in this
country, the right to be servants and slaves.’ Milliyet, 19 September 1930.
30. Between  1932  and  1946,  Celadet  and  Kamuran  Bedir  Khan  edited  two  bilingual  French-
Kurdish revues (Hawar, 1932-1943, and Roja Nû, 1943-1946) each with a supplement in Kurdish
(Ronahî, 1942-1945, and Stêr, 1944-1945, respectively). The two brothers also wrote 17 workbooks
on topics such as the Kurdish alphabet and religious lessons in Kurdish. 
31. Created by the Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti at the end of the 1910s, the Khoybun renewed this
myth of Persian origin, especially during the 1930s. 
32. See the members’ list of Hawar in 1933 in CADN, Fonds Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, 1055. Note on
Hawar. Damascus, 4 April 1933.
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Kurdish journal Hawar, edited by Celadet Bedir Khan. Ibid.
34. IKP, FONDS RONDOT, Meeting between the Turkish Consul and Kamuran Bedir Khan. Beirut, 8
December 1932.
35. Giving  in  a  second  time  to  the  requests  by  the  Consul  of  Turkey,  Kamuran Bedir  Khan
accepted to meet this official again on 5 January 1933. After this meeting, the ‘Turks spread the
news in the eastern provinces that’ the Bedir Khan Brothers had rallied to Turkey and would be
returning  to  the  country.  CADN,  Fonds  Beyrouth,  Cabinet  Politique.  General  Security.  Beirut,  18
January 1933.
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36. IKP, FONDS RONDOT, Conversation between Celadet Bedir Khan and the Turks. Damascus, 3
July 1935.
ABSTRACTS
While traditional accounts of Atatürk’s Turkey approach the state as a powerful and centralized
apparatus, this article suggests, on the contrary, that Turkey was still a state in the making and
lacked a consistent policy in the face of the multiple social and political challenges that emerged
in the 1920 and 1930s. Concretely, the article suggests that the Turkish regime’s response to
contestation was to put in place extremely violent policies concerning the inhabitants of the
Eastern provinces, in particular. In so doing, it paradoxically contributed to the creation of a
specific ‘territorial’  and ‘cultural’  entity: ‘the East.’  It also argues that despite Kemalist elites’
strong ideological commitment, Turkish authorities were obliged to take into consideration the
dissenting discourses elaborated by Kurdish intellectuals who claimed the existence of a Kurdish
region  in  Eastern  Anatolia.  In  that  respect,  and  based  on  a  historical  approach,  the  article
analyzes the Kemalist period through the lens of the interaction between the Turkish state and
the Kurdish movement in order show how cultural, political, and religious spaces are constructed,
reshaped, and eventually politicized as an outcome of the struggle between the state and some
segments of a given society. 
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